essay 代写：解读《基金法》
essay 代写：解读《基金法》
中国资本市场缺乏有效的基金经理激励，这是基金业绩问题的核心所在。除了治理结构的缺陷外，我国现行的基金经理薪酬制度也是基金经理无法通过运营方式实现投资者利益最大化的重要原因。中国《基金法》规定，基金管理人的薪酬，按年1.5%的年利率计算，截止基金净资产值累计管理费。但实际上，目前的股票基金管理费是每年提取1.5%的费率。开放式基金的额外认购费约为1.5%和0.5%。
essay 代写：解读《基金法》
如果算上一年期的银行储蓄利率，投资者购买基金的机会成本接近5%。这意味着基金规模越大，管理费提取越多，基金经理的收入就越高。因此，这种薪酬方式并不能清晰反映基金经理的投资管理能力。基金经理的薪酬只取决于基金的规模，即使盈利能力较低，即使给基金投资者造成损失，基金经理仍可亮出提及管理费。在这种缺乏风险激励的情况下，基金经理的薪酬与风险负债不对称导致基金经理缺乏盈利动力。
essay 代写：解读《基金法》
The lack of effective fund manager incentives is seen in Chinese capital markets, which lie at the core of the problem of fund performance. In addition to the governance structure of the defect, China current fund manager remuneration system is an important reason for the fund managers cannot maximize the interests of investors by the way to operate. China ‘Fund Law’ stipulates that the fund managers’ compensation, 1.5% annual rate by the end of the fund’s net asset value accrued management annual fee. However, in fact, the current stock fund management fee is 1.5% annual rate of extraction. Open-end funds have an additional subscription fee of about 1.5% and 0.5% redemption fee.
essay 代写：解读《基金法》
If you count the one-year bank savings interest rates, the opportunity cost of investors to buy the fund is close to 5%. This means that the larger the fund, the more extracted management fees, fund manager’s income is higher. Therefore, this remuneration way does not clearly reflect fund manager’s investment management capabilities. The fund manager’s remuneration depends only on the size of the fund, even if profitability is low, even to fund investors caused a loss, managers can still shine mention management fee. In the case of such a lack of risk incentives, fund manager’s remuneration and risk liability asymmetry leading fund managers who lack motivation of profit.
