澳洲论文：管理层激励与公司绩效

澳洲论文：管理层激励与公司绩效

从上世纪80年代就对管理人员的补偿研究。它是一种激励机制，是由股东对经理人激励他们实现组织绩效（延森和Meckling，1976；延森& Murphy，1990）。也有文献，找出管理激励与股权结构之间的关系。在股权结构存在有更多外部股东的组织的目的是用较少的股票为基础的补偿（Mehran，1995）。

墨菲已经给定的理论被称为代理理论并根据他的利益组织中的管理者可以与利益相关者的利益只有通过管理者激励与公司绩效（墨菲，1999）。然而在已研究的文献证明是不一样的。在发达国家，大多数的研究表明，有很强的与公司绩效与管理层激励之间的正相关关系。董事会薪酬是股权结构相关。该做了一项研究，在1979和1980之间的153个随机组织发现，公司的业绩是非常依赖于给定的对管理者的激励（Mehran，1998）。伯杰做了452家美国公司的一项研究发现现金工资和奖金是用来代替固定工资。这表明，在企业价值的变化不影响首席执行官工资和奖金的补偿。

澳洲论文：管理层激励与公司绩效

From the 1980s there is a huge literature on the compensation of the managers. It is an incentive mechanism which is offered by the shareholders to the managers to motivate them towards the performance of the organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). There are also literatures to find out the relationship between managerial incentives and ownership structure. Organizations having more presence of outside shareholders in the ownership structure are intended to use less equity-based compensations (Mehran, 1995).

Murphy has given a theory called agency theory and according to him interests of the managers in an organization can be aligned with the interests of the stakeholders only by relating the incentives of the managers with the performance of the company (Murphy, 1999). However the proofs in the already studied literatures are not the same. In developed countries most of the studies show that there is very strong and positive relationship between the firm performance and managerial incentives. Compensation of the board of directors is related to the ownership structure. Mehran did a study on 153 random organizations between 1979 and 1980 and found that the firm’s performance is very much dependent on the incentives given to the managers (Mehran, 1998). Berger did a study on 452 U.S. companies and found out that cash salary and bonus payments were used instead of fixed salaries. It shows that the changes in the value of firm do not affect the CEO’s salary and bonus compensation.