澳洲论文代写骗子：内部权力结构最大化公司价值
阿曼•阿尔钦和德姆塞茨(1972)的基础上如何安排内部权力结构最大化公司价值,提出“团队生产理论”。理论研究从企业交易成本的角度来解释企业内部生产团队的激励问题。他们认为作为生产团队的任何产品都是由企业成员共同生产的，任何成员的行为都会影响其他成员的生产力。根据团队生产理论，企业的产出是团队合作的结果，但是每个成员的贡献是不能准确分解和观察的。因此，不可能按照每个人的实际贡献来支付补偿。因此，只要团队成员的机会成本小于懒人的消费边际效益，团队成员就会缺乏动力。为了减少它，必须有监督者。
澳洲论文代写骗子：内部权力结构最大化公司价值
为了提高监理人员的积极性，监理人员必须拥有修改合同条款和指挥其他成员的权利，使监理人员必须是固定在队伍中的业主，因为费用对于非业主来说太高了。Holmstrom(1982)进一步研究团队生产理论,并认为,如果主管剩余利益的每个成员的贡献,贡献指标会影响决策作为一个主管,所以所有权是一个非常重要的角色。所有权应与贡献挂钩，有效解决激励问题。综上所述，经理人与投资者是委托代理关系。契约理论可以从投资公司的角度来看，即投资者与经理人之间的契约并不完整，需要建立制衡权力滥用的机制，基金经理人需要激励投资者追求最大利益。因此，它是公司治理安排对委托代理合同关系和配置剩余控制权和剩余索取权的功能。
澳洲论文代写骗子：内部权力结构最大化公司价值
Alchian and Demsetz（1972）on the basis of how to arrange the internal power structure to maximize the corporate value，proposed ‘Team Production Theory’. The theoretical study of firm focus from transaction costs to explain the incentive problem of internal production team. They think as the production team refers to any product is a co-production by the enterprise members, and any member of act will affect the productivity of other members. According to the team production theory, Output of companies is the result of team work together, but the contribution of each individual member cannot accurately decompose and observation. Therefore, it is impossible to pay compensation in accordance with the actual contribution of each person. So, as long as the team members the opportunity cost of lazy less than slacker consumption marginal benefit, team members will lack motivation. In order to reduce it, there must be supervisors.
澳洲论文代写骗子：内部权力结构最大化公司价值
In order to enhance the enthusiasm of supervisors, supervisors must have the rights to modify the terms of the contract and command other members, so that the supervisor must be owner of fixed into the team, because cost is too high for non-owner.Holmstrom（1982）further studied team production theory, and believed that if the supervisor remaining interest from the every member of the contribution, metric contribution will influence decision-making as a supervisor, so ownership is a very important role. Ownership should be linked with the contribution, and effectively solve the incentive problem.In summary, managers and investors are principal-agent relationship. Contract theory can be viewed in perspective of Investment Company that is incomplete with contracts between investors and managers, the need for balance mechanism against abuse of power, and with incentives of fund managers for investors to pursue the maximum benefit. Thus, it is a function of corporate governance arrangements for the principal-agent contract relationship and configuration residual control rights and residual claims.