在本篇澳洲论文代写价格-红木市场的寡头垄断结构中，根据绿色和平组织的描述，红木市场由少数几家顶尖的锯木厂和出口商主导，主要由两家实力雄厚的企业控制。这意味着红木市场的结构是寡头垄断的。寡头垄断市场结构与垄断市场结构十分相似。然而，在这种情况下，不止一家公司主导市场。这几家小公司占据了大部分市场份额(Dunne et al. 2013)。在寡头垄断的市场结构下，企业串通一气，为市场设定产量和价格，以实现利润最大化。无论是红木国王，佩雷拉和费雷拉决定勾结，以确定价格和限制竞争，以赚取垄断利润。因此，如果这两家在寡头垄断市场上占主导地位的公司能够成功地串通一气，操纵红木价格，他们就可以相互信任对方的产量。这将在短期内使他们的利润最大化。有关澳洲论文代写价格-红木市场的寡头垄断结构分析如下：
The diagram illustrates the profit maximising firms that produces an amount where the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost. P denotes the profit maximising price whereas; Q denotes profit maximising quantity. The profit maximising price is determined by the demand curve (Vali 2014).
The short-run is considered as the intangible period of time where at least one production factor is fixed however; other production factors are variable. All production in the economic market is likely to take place in the short-run. The short-run profit maximising production decisions of firms that are harvesting mahogany illegally will augment their production if the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost (Vorotnikova and Asci 2015).
The graph illustrates that the marginal cost denotes the supply curve that is above the shutdown point. The harvesting of mahogany will illegally continue if the average cost is less than per unit price.
Operating costs are the expenses that are mostly associated with the business. The cost of illegal harvesting is related to the harmful impact on biodiversity. However, operating cost of legal harvesting leads to adequate planning of natural resources. Reforms of legal systems acts as the powerful tool in order to fight against illegal activities. However, these reforms require to be tailored cautiously in order to fit local state of affairs (Nutkani, Loh and Blaabjerg 2014). Brazil has initiated the law to prevent illegal harvesting by putting a moratorium on mahogany harvesting. Illegal harvesting requires to diminish the spread between the operating costs illegally and operating costs legitimately.
According to the depiction of Greenpeace, the mahogany market was dominated by a small elite group of sawmills and exporters controlled largely by two powerful players. This implies that the structure of the mahogany market is oligopoly.
The impact of collusion is likely to lead to decrease in the production of the mahogany tree population.
Collusion between the mahogany kings is likely to act as the dominant strategy in the long-run and as a result, it acts as the preferable alternative for the firms. In other words, collusive treaties are normally illegal as in the long-run it becomes difficult for the firms to coordinate their movements.