In this case, both the Appellants in the case had been accused of having bodily injuries with a sense of intent. The accusations that were recorded in this case were based “to a decisive extent” on one of the verbal statements that were given by the victim, who was later found dead (but the reason of the death of the victim was “not based on his injuries” that he suffered). Spencer (2011) highlighted that the remaining appellants of the case were accused of kidnapping, and their conviction was completely in alignment “to a decisive extent” on one of the verbal commitments made by one of the victims of the incident who feared to attend the trail process.
It was permissible under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to allow the evidences that were showcased in this manner by the trial judges. The Act provided for a very generic presumption that the hearing of the evidence should not be permitted in the trials pertaining to the criminal cases but the assumptions were negated when the witnesses or the victims were not available due to one of the number of highlighted reasons (this is inclusive of that victim who was dead even before the initiation of the trial under section 116(2) (a) or the witness who was absconding due to fear of the trail under section 116(2) (e).